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1 INTRODUCTION 
Following the 2007 Financial Crisis, economic growth has been stagnant in most of the 
world, but there is another phenomenon spreading worldwide: growing economic ine-
quality. Starting from the 1920's economic inequality had actually been decreasing, but 
this trend has seemingly reversed itself during the 1970's. Now in 2014 economic ine-
quality is approaching all time high values and the wealth of the world is owned by ever 
smaller groups of people. A recent report by the OECD, published in December 2014, 
now questions whether the stagnant growth is partially caused by increasing economic 
inequality. 
 
This question is the topic of this thesis; economic inequality and its effect on economic 
growth. The causality between economic inequality and growth is not clear and can go 
both ways, but this thesis will focus on growth as the dependent variable to allow for a 
more focused viewpoint. Before focusing on the causality between growth and inequal-
ity we will first examine the measures used for them. The primary measures in this the-
sis are GDP per capita and the Gini coefficient for growth and inequality respectively. 
GDP can be divided into several factors that have different levels of importance for 
countries depending on the structure of their economy. Each of these factors will be 
analysed separately and connected to actual data from four Nordic countries: Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden. Inequality is similarly observed for these countries using 
the Gini coefficient. 
 
After examining growth and inequality separately the thesis will focus on the regression 
model by the OECD researcher Federico Cingano to prove the link from inequality to 
growth. The results are then compared to a similar model by Sarah Voitchovsky, which 
also looks into the effect inequality has on growth in different income levels. 
 
After this, the thesis will focus on the actual research questions by combining the find-
ings from the regression analyses to the causes of economic growth and economic ine-
quality and discuss the measures to decrease inequality in light of the findings. 
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1.1 Research aims and questions 
This topic was chosen primarily because of its relevance to recent events, but also be-
cause of the author's interest in the interaction of economic and political issues in shap-
ing both economic inequality and the successive financial crises. Understanding and 
clarifying the tangle of events that started from 2007 might allow for a clearer picture of 
where we are going. 
 
This thesis has two research questions: 
• what is the effect of economic inequality on economic growth and 
• what measures could be used to decrease economic inequality without unduly 
hampering economic growth. 
Through these questions this aims to generate more discussion and awareness of these 
issue and their relevance to the current events and the future. 
1.2 Material and method 
The method used in this thesis is literature review. Federico Cingano's findings by his 
regression analysis model are compared to Sarah Voitchovsky's findings. Their rele-
vance and implications are discussed and compared. The results are then analysed based 
on Thomas Piketty's discussion and conclusions on inequality. 
 
The primary sources used for this thesis are Thomas Piketty's book Capital in the 
Twenty-First Century, the Credit Suisse Global Wealth Report of 2014, the OECD Re-
port by  Federico Cingano and Does the Profile of Income Inequality Matter for Eco-
nomic Growth study by Sarah Voitchovsky. 
1.3 Theoretical framework 
Economic inequality and its relationship to growth has been the focus of several studies 
during the past decades. One of the earliest studies was by Simon Kuznets (1955) and 
his inverted U-curve. His main conclusion is that the development between growth and 
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inequality will in the long term form an inverted U-curve, so that a country will experi-
ence an increase in inequality in the early stages of its economic development, and later 
as it matures see inequality fall. This theory marked an important starting point for 
many inequality studies that followed. 
 
Persson and Tabellini's (1994) study presents that in unequal economies the govern-
ments would favour more redistributive policies. This in turn would affect incentives, 
and thus decrease growth. Inequality would thus hamper growth. 
 
Barro's (1997) study presents a negative relationship between the growth of per capita 
income and initial per capita income level. In other words in high per capita countries 
growth speed will fall, and thus economic growth will converge inequality both within a 
country and between them. 
 
Forbes's (2000) study, using panel data on countries, finds in contrast to Persson and 
Tabellini's a positive relationship in short term between inequality and growth. 
 
Voitchovsky (2005) focused on the effect of different parts of income distribution on 
income inequality. She also focused on using more measures for inequality than just the 
general measures, such as the Gini index. Her approach is used in this thesis to validate 
the inadequacy of the Gini index in explaining the link to growth. 
1.4 Limitations 
Economic inequality research often suffers from a lack of long period data. This makes 
it difficult to make analysis on long term development of economic inequality, and so 
all conclusions are largely based on theoretical data and not empirical data. 
 
Because of the time limits for the thesis, practical examples on growth and inequality 
are mostly limited to Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. This will allow for a fo-
cus on the comparison of relatively similar countries, but in slightly different circum-
stances.  
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2 CAUSES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 
A nation's economy is often measured using gross domestic product (GDP). We do this 
because it's quick and simplifies all the data into one number. It can however be mis-
leading as two nations with the same number can have a very different type of economy. 
It also does not account for the depreciation on the equipment used in the production of 
goods and services during the year. 
 
The equation used to calculate GDP is as follows: 
 
GDP = C + I + G + (X - M) 
 
Where C is consumption, I is investments, G is government spending and X - M is net 
foreign trade. 
 
To limit the effects the size of the population has on the data, this thesis will use GDP 
per capita as a measure of economic growth. GDP per capita is calculated by dividing 
the GDP of the country in question with its population: 
 
GDP per capita = GDP / Total population 
 
Economic growth for a nation means an increase in real GDP, as in adjusted for infla-
tion. So true growth must factor in the effect of inflation, a nominal growth figure might 
mean a loss in purchasing power if the effect of inflation is stronger than the growth. 
 
An increase in GDP means an increase in aggregate demand or supply. All causes that 
affect these two factors will also affect economic growth. (Pettinger 2012). 
2.1 Demand side factors 
A country's demand is the sum of consumer spending, gross private domestic invest-
ments, government spending and net export and import. How the demand is divided be-
tween these factors depends on the type of economy the nation has. (Pettinger 2012) 
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2.1.1 Consumer spending 
Consumer spending is the sum of expenditure used for personal consumption, for goods 
and services, in a nation. Typically this is the largest portion of the aggregate demand. 
 
Consumer spending can be influenced by various factors. Lowering taxes raises the 
amount of money households have for spending and saving, that is the income after 
taxes, the disposable income (Investopedia 2014). Disposable income can also be in-
creased by increasing wages, but it's often quicker to change taxation. A larger dispos-
able income can contribute to increased demand by expanding consumption, but it can 
also lead to increased savings. This is determined by consumer sentiment; the con-
sumer's opinion on his/her financial status and short and long-term aspects of the econ-
omy. A person with little savings and property would much rather save the extra money 
in a depression. This is however a negative effect for the government if the taxes were 
cut in order to promote spending. A high consumer sentiment on the other hand pro-
motes spending  (Investopedia 2010a). 
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 Figure 1: Consumption as a percentage of GDP 
 
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden 
2005 47.8  50.0  42.6  46.0  
2006 47.4  50.4  40.9  44.8  
2007 47.5  48.8  41.3  44.3  
2008 47.5  49.6  39.2  44.6  
2009 48.7  52.5  43.1  47.1  
2010 47.9  53.2  42.8  46.4  
2011 48.2  53.7  41.1  46.3  
2012 48.8  54.5  40.4  46.5  
2013 48.8  54.6  41.0  46.7  
Table 1: Consumption as a percentage of GDP 
The Nordic countries all show fairly similar figures, with Finland as the highest starting 
from 50 % and ending at 54,6 % and Norway as the lowest from 42,6 % to 41 %. The 
difference can be explained by Norway's natural resources and the role of investments 
in the economy. The increase from 2007 and 2008 thus reflect decreased investments 
because of the Financial Crisis and the increased role of consumption in the GDP. Nor-
way and Finland show a more prominent increase and are thus somewhat more reliant 
on investments than Denmark and Sweden. Norway's recovery however has been faster. 
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2.1.2 Gross private domestic investment 
Gross private domestic investment (GPDI) means the additions to the fixed assets of the 
nation and the net change of the inventory. Fixed assets mostly consist of construction 
of roads, railways, schools, hospitals, private residential buildings, commercial and in-
dustrial buildings. Inventory means the stock of goods held by firms. (The World Bank) 
 
GPDI can be used as an indicator for future capacity for production. Investments are 
influenced by the cost of money, the interest rate. A lower interest rate will make more 
investments profitable and thus increase demand. Interest rates are set by the central 
banks, so not all nations are able to use loose monetary policy independently as a meas-
ure to bolster faltering economy (Investopedia 2003). 
 
Figure 2: Investments as a percentage of GDP 
 
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden 
2005 22.2  24.6  21.5  22.0  
2006 24.5  24.0  23.0  23.0  
2007 25.4  25.5  25.8  24.6  
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2008 24.1  25.1  24.5  24.5  
2009 18.9  21.2  22.3  20.9  
2010 18.4  21.6  23.3  22.9  
2011 19.5  23.5  23.8  23.8  
2012 18.9  22.5  24.9  22.6  
2013 18.8  21.4  26.4  22.2  
Table 2: Investments as a percentage of GDP 
In 2005 Denmark, Norway and Sweden were very close to each other with Finland a 
few percentages higher at 24,6%. Following the Financial Crisis the countries develop-
ments followed each other closely, but with differences in 2009 and 2011. In 2009 
Denmark was unable to recover as quickly and in 2011 the start of the Euro Crisis 
pushed Finland and Sweden back down. Norway's investments were likely buffered by 
its oil fund and it did not suffer a similar drop. The development of the investment 
graph is a reversal of the consumption graph. The more investments drop as a percent-
age of GDP, the more important consumption becomes. However this does not explain 
all developments as Denmark, which suffered a heavier hit on investment than Finland, 
did not experience as a similar increase in consumption as Finland. The difference must 
be made up by government spending and net foreign trade effect. 
2.1.3 Government spending 
Government spending is less focused on increasing GDP and more on political values. 
Depending on what values the country deems important its spending can focus on very 
different matters. Government spending includes expenditures on goods and services, 
and most of the expenditures on national defence and security (The World Bank). Euro-
pean nations typically have a larger relative government budget than the rest of the 
world. 
 
According to Keynesian economic theory, government spending can be used as a tool to 
bolster economic growth, however this is more popular in countries with socialist ten-
dencies. The theory states that due to imperfect competition, wages and prices fail to 
adjust accordingly and thus result in unnecessary unemployment; the bust of the busi-
ness cycle. The solution according to the theory is macroeconomic stabilization by the 
state and central bank using fiscal or monetary policies. (Radcliffe 2014) 
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Fiscal policy essentially means taxation and government spending, and can be used in 
an attempt to control unemployment rate and stabilize business cycles. Taxes, as previ-
ously, mentioned can influence consumer spending in order to promote growth. Gov-
ernment spending in fiscal policy often means large investments, such as building new 
highways or repairing old ones. The idea is that these new investments will create new 
jobs and thus lower unemployment rate. (Investopedia 2013) 
 
The problem in fiscal policy is that it is hard to use in a way that would be fair to all. A 
tax-cut might benefit a certain income level disproportionally and government invest-
ments will benefit the group receiving the investment more than the rest of the popula-
tion. (Investopedia 2013) 
 
Monetary policy means controlling the money supply, which in turn affects interest 
rates. The interest rate is set by the central bank of that currency, European Central 
Bank (ECB) for the Euro, Federal Reserve for the US dollar, Bank of Japan for the yen 
etc. For the Euro countries this raises a notable issue as they have relinquished their au-
thority on monetary policy to a supranational organization and thus cannot influence it 
independently. The ECB must try to create a monetary policy that fits the needs of 
countries that have very different types of economies and needs. A very difficult task, if 
not impossible, as the Euro Crisis demonstrates. The lower the interest rate, the cheaper 
loans become. This influences both households and companies. With a low interest rate 
households that were considering large investments, such as new houses, cars etc., will 
go ahead with the transactions and increase consumption. For the companies the effect 
is compounded as large investments from companies not only create increased con-
sumption but often new jobs as well. (Investopedia 2003) 
 
The problem in using monetary policy is that by loosening interest rates too much will 
increase inflation and by too little will slow growth. This is further complicated by the 
fact that politicians can feel the temptation to loosen monetary policy in order to con-
tinue their debt funded policies and leave the aftermath for others to clean up. (In-
vestopedia 2003) 
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An alternative point of view, often favoured by the US, the classical economic theory 
argues that the fiscal policy favoured by the Keynesians only serves to decrease re-
sources available to individuals and companies that would spend them more efficiently 
elsewhere. (Vitez 2014) 
 
Nordic countries currently favour extensive public sector services for their citizens, and 
therefore need heavier taxation than other countries. Americans on the other hand repre-
sent a different ideology and would rather place their trust on private sector services. 
 
Figure 3: Government spending as a percentage of GDP 
 
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden 
2005 24.5  21.5  19.7  24.9  
2006 24.2  21.4  18.9  24.6  
2007 24.3  20.9  19.3  24.1  
2008 25.2  21.7  19.1  24.6  
2009 28.1  24.2  22.3  26.2  
2010 27.6  23.9  22.0  25.2  
2011 26.8  23.6  21.5  25.2  
2012 26.9  24.5  21.3  25.9  
2013 26.7  24.9  21.9  26.2  
15 
 
Table 3: Government spending as a percentage of GDP 
In 2005 the countries were divided into two groups with Norway and Finland forming 
the lower group with 19,7 % and 21,5 %, and Denmark and Sweden forming the higher 
group 24,5 % and 24,9 %. As previously the change started from 2007, with all coun-
tries raising spending at least a few percentages from original levels. Finland is the ex-
ception with spending raising 3,4 % from 2005 to 2013. This is likely connected to 
problems with the Euro. It is notable that spending has not returned to original levels for 
any of the countries, even though at least Norway has regained its previous investment 
levels. 
2.1.4 Imports and exports 
Imports and exports are often compared in relation to each other. More imports means a 
current account deficit for the country and vice versa. Generally surplus is better for the 
economy as the deficit would have to be funded by borrowing more or increasing taxa-
tion. To decrease a deficit a country can try to affect the exchange rate of its currency, 
competitiveness of its industries or the quality of its products. (Pettinger 2013) 
 
Export-based economies often take measures to keep their currencies from appreciating 
too much. Finland prior to joining the Euro used devaluation as a tool to bolster exports. 
The cheaper currency will then make exports more affordable to import countries and 
thus increase demand. At same it will make imports more expensive and further de-
crease trade deficit. However this method is not without its problems. A country that 
imports a great deal of its resources will instead increase expenses and undo any bene-
fits in exports. Some resources could instead be produced domestically, such as food, 
but energy and other raw material based resources are more difficult. Devaluation also 
increases inflation which will also cut into the benefits. Uncontrolled deprecation of a 
currency runs the risk of hyperinflation. Overreliance on devaluation also makes export-
ing companies less willing to invest in long-term productivity. 
 
The percentage of imports and exports of the GDP are often very close to each other. 
This relates to the size of the economy and how much of the economy is based on for-
eign trade. 
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 Figure 4: Imports as a percentage of GDP 
 
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden 
2005 41.8  36.4  27.8  38.7  
2006 46.6  39.0  28.2  40.6  
2007 48.5  39.2  30.5  41.3  
2008 50.6  41.4  29.5  43.5  
2009 42.4  34.3  27.7  38.7  
2010 43.6  37.4  28.5  40.7  
2011 47.4  40.0  28.3  42.0  
2012 48.6  41.1  27.6  41.4  
2013 48.5  39.1  28.2  38.9  
Table 4: Imports as a percentage of GDP 
In 2005 Norway is exception for the four Nordic countries with a markedly lower im-
port percentage at 27,8 %. Denmark, Finland and Sweden closely mirror each others' 
development with a dip in demand in 2009. Only Norway maintained constant levels 
from 2005 to 2013. The more radical movements of the three other countries reflect a 
greater reliance on imports and also greater sensitivity to shocks, such as the Financial 
Crisis of 2007. The stability of Norway's imports show that Norway's demand was not 
affected by the Financial Crisis. 
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 Figure 5: Exports as a percentage of GDP 
 
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden 
2005 47.4  40.3  44.1  45.9  
2006 50.5  43.2  45.4  48.2  
2007 51.3  44.0  44.1  48.3  
2008 53.8  45.1  46.8  49.8  
2009 46.7  36.3  40.0  44.5  
2010 49.7  38.7  40.5  46.2  
2011 52.9  39.2  41.9  46.7  
2012 54.0  39.6  40.9  46.3  
2013 54.3  38.2  38.9  43.8  
Table 5: Exports as a percentage of GDP 
The export chart mirrors the import chart closely: a dip in 2009 followed by slower re-
covery and again slow decline. By 2013 Denmark has seemingly managed to stabilize 
both its import and export levels. The imports at least can be explained by the type of 
products exported. Finland mainly exports investment goods and Denmark focuses 
more on food products. The necessity levels of these products in consumption show the 
difference in recovery rates. Another interesting difference is that while Norway showed 
no changes in import levels from 2005 to 2013, export levels clearly decreased. Even 
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Norway cannot affect decreased worldwide demand and suffers as a result of a global 
recession. Finland is similarly struggling in regaining competitivity in exports. 
 
Figure 6: Net foreign trade as a percentage of GDP 
 
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden 
2005 5.6  3.9  16.2  7.2  
2006 3.9  4.2  17.2  7.6  
2007 2.8  4.8  13.7  7.0  
2008 3.3  3.6  17.3  6.3  
2009 4.4  2.0  12.3  5.8  
2010 6.1  1.3  11.9  5.5  
2011 5.5  -0.9  13.6  4.7  
2012 5.4  -1.4  13.3  4.9  
2013 5.7  -1.0  10.7  4.9  
Table 6: Net foreign trade as a percentage of GDP 
When exports surpass imports it results in surplus in the current account. A surplus cur-
rent account means more jobs and increased aggregate demand, which in turn will in-
crease GDP. Surplus is therefore the more desirable option. However every country ob-
viously cannot have a surplus current account all the time, as the demand and supply 
must balance out. All the Nordic countries had a surplus in the current account starting 
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from 2005 and during the Financial Crisis 2007-2009, and only in 2011 did Finland 
show a deficit.  
 
The Nordic countries can be divided into three trends. Norway and Finland showed a 
clear decrease in net foreign trade, Sweden a slight decrease and Denmark has in 2013 
returned to the levels it had during 2005. The trend is not so worrying for Norway as 
they still have a very clear surplus, but each year Finland continues to have a negative 
net foreign trade will mean increased difficulties in balancing the government budget. 
Finland's deficit from 2011 onwards can at least partly be explained by the Euro Crisis. 
Decreased demand and competitivity both contribute to Finland's lowered exports and 
because of the Euro, devaluation is not an option.   
2.2 Supply side factors 
Supply-side often represents the long term measures to induce growth. These include 
increased capital, increased working population, increased labour productivity, discov-
ering new raw materials and technological improvements. However the exact effects 
and causes are disputed as supply-side economists emphasize the importance of supply 
in economic growth and Keynesians focus on demand. The key issue is the difference in 
opinion regarding the belief that supply will create its own demand as dictated by Say's 
law (Investopedia 2010c). 
 
 Increased capital means new investments in production or infrastructure. This re-
sults in increased aggregate supply but can also affect demand as discussed in gov-
ernment spending. (Harper 2013)  
 
 Increased working population means higher production, increased tax revenue and 
greater household consumption. Altogether it means that population is a primary 
source of economic growth. Population can be increased through natural growth 
and immigration, which makes its development of great interest for economic con-
siderations. Many modern countries face great challenges from decreasing and ag-
ing populations, Japan first among them. 
 
20 
 
 Labour productivity essentially means better education, training and improved 
technology. In developed countries better education and training no longer greatly 
increase productivity so the focus has shifted to technology. Robotics is a modern 
example of increasing productivity through technology. 
 
 Raw materials are a important part of global economy. Currently oil is clearly the 
most important resource and its exporters benefit greatly from it. However as tech-
nological advances create new products and demands, it may also create the need 
for new raw materials. Countries with access to this new resource have the potential 
to reap comparable benefits to oil exporters if the resource has enough demand. 
 
 Technological improvements affect capital and labour efficiency and serve to in-
crease aggregate supply. Internet is a good example of past improvement that 
greatly increased efficiency. Robotics could be the next big leap. 
 
Now that we have considered all the factors for GDP we can look at the total growth of 
the Nordic countries. To account for the difference in population we look at GDP per 
capita figures. The GDP per capita growth data is the sum of all the other figures and 
shows the overall development of the four Nordic countries during this period. 
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 Figure 7: GDP per capita growth (%) 
 
 
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden 
2005 2.2  2.4  1.9  2.4  
2006 3.5  3.7  1.5  4.1  
2007 0.4  4.7  1.6  2.6  
2008 -1.3  0.3  -1.2  -1.3  
2009 -5.6  -8.7  -2.9  -6.0  
2010 1.2  2.5  -0.8  5.1  
2011 0.7  2.1  0.0  1.9  
2012 -1.0  -1.9  1.6  -1.0  
2013 -0.9  -1.7  -0.7  0.7  
Table 7: GDP per capita growth (%) 
In 2005 all the Nordic countries were experiencing growth, particularly Finland. This 
changed with the Financial Crisis, and since then none of the Nordic countries has man-
aged constant growth. Even Norway's GDP per capita decreased 0,7 % in 2013.  Finland 
clearly fared the worst, as it suffered the most during the Financial Crisis and is still 
struggling. Denmark is a moderate mirror of Finland's development: during growth pe-
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riods it's growth didn't match Finland's rate, but neither did its economy shrink as much 
in 2009. Norway and Sweden fared much better, with Norway's dip in 2009 comparably 
much smaller than the others. 
 
Now that we have finished considering each aspect of the GDP we can focus on eco-
nomic inequality. 
3 ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND ITS EFFECTS 
Economic inequality has the potential to cause social unrest, as does all inequality, The 
Arab Spring of December 2010 and the Occupy Wall Street movement in 2011 are a 
few of the events sparked by growing economic inequality. Highly chaotic social tur-
moil is in no-one's best interests, and therefore understanding the effects of economic 
inequality plays in our economy is important. In the world of the today, in which 1 % of 
populace owns almost half the wealth in the world. this is a critical issue (Davies et al 
2014 p. 32). 
 
Economic inequality is formed of two factors: wealth inequality and income inequality. 
Wealth of a person can be defined as the total market value of all the assets owned. As-
sets can, for example, be composed of houses, cars, businesses, savings and investments. 
(Investopedia 2007)  
 
Income inequality as defined by Thomas Piketty in his book Capital in the Twenty-First 
Century is "the result of adding up these two components: inequality of income from 
labor and inequality of income from capital" (Piketty 2014 p. 242). In other words, the 
wages and the profit. Wealth and income inequality do overlap somewhat, but by exam-
ining them separately allows for a perspective into the actual causes of the disparity. 
Examining wealth is especially important for its relevance in inheritance, and the role it 
plays in accumulating wealth each generation. We will first examine income inequality. 
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3.1 Income inequality 
The income inequality in society could result from many variations: High equality 
wages and low equality profit, low equality wages and high equality profit or even low 
equality wages and low equality profit. This depends on legislation, labour market solu-
tions and the local concept of fairness in regards to wages and capital income, but socie-
ties tend to leans towards more equal wages and unequal capital income (Piketty 2014 p. 
244). Income inequality can also be influenced by the size of the investments. Higher 
sum investments make it easier to leverage the profit and thus create a higher return on 
investment. Wealthy people also do not need to have the same level of expertise and 
time to manage their investments as they can hire professionals to do it for them. 
(Piketty 2014 p.243) 
 
To compare income inequality Piketty studied the financial records of the world and 
identified certain countries during certain time periods to serve as comparison points for 
low, medium and high labour and capital income inequality. This was not meant for di-
rect comparison, but to provide perspective for the values. Rather than put idealistic 
values to what values a highly equal society should have for income division, he used 
historical values from real countries to give a more realistic measure of how a high 
equal society divided income. For low inequality measure he used the Scandinavian 
countries during the 1970-1980's, for middle inequality he used France and Germany in 
2010, and for high inequality he used the US in 2010. First let's look at the labour in-
come division from these countries. 
 
Piketty's research shows that the wages for the top 10 % earners in low wage income 
inequality countries account for 20 % of total wages, in the moderate wage inequality 
countries for 25 %, and in high wage inequality countries for 35 %. The wage income 
share for the lower 50 % of population are 35 %, 30 % and 25 % respectively. (Piketty 
2014 p. 247) 
 
Inequality in regards to labour income is generally smaller than in capital income, but 
this does not mean it is not significant since wages greatly affect consumption, a large 
part of the GDP. The rich do not consume much more as their income increases as their 
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basic needs are already met, they either save it or invest it themselves. New investments 
are good for the economy, but consumption is often even more important. Cutting the 
wages of poor and middle income to bolster high income would mean cutting consump-
tion in favour of investments, but investments often need a steady consumption to be 
profitable. Forcing the poor to borrow more and more to meet their basic needs, such as 
housing, is not sustainable and can lead to a financial crisis like what happened in sub-
prime crisis in the US. Only in the US the lower 50 % earn less than the top 10 %, but 
for the richest people, total income is based more on capital income than labour. It is 
notable that the shares of high income top 10 % and low income 50 % are almost re-
versed between high and low inequality countries. National policy clearly has a role in 
the development, but to get total income we also need to consider capital income. 
(Piketty 2014 p. 255-256) 
 
Capital income is much less equal, but this is hardly surprising. Investments come from 
savings and borrowing, those with a lot of savings or other property can more easily 
borrow more without suffering crippling interest payments. Poor and even average in-
come households must carefully plan their investments and cannot borrow as big 
amounts as high income households. The rich can therefore invest more often and in 
bigger amounts, creating the leverage effect on profit mentioned previously. (Piketty 
2014 p. 257) 
 
Piketty's observations regarding capital income division for the richest 10 % in the same 
countries during the same time periods as in the wage income observation for low, me-
dium and high inequality are 50 %, 60 % and 70 % respectively. The lower 50 % capital 
income have shares of 10 %, 5 % and 5 % respectively (Piketty 2014 p. 248) 
 
The contrast to the labour income division is clear. The poorer population generally 
have very little, if any at all, capital income. The importance of capital income in wealth 
inequality is obvious, as capital is often much more protected from the effects of infla-
tion and recession. Stock prices may fall in recession, but alternative investments are 
readily available to the attentive investor. Gold and currencies can also serve as alterna-
tive investments options to help mitigate the effects of inflation and recession. Low in-
come households on other hand often cannot move their minimal savings to these op-
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tions as easily, since they need them to fund their daily needs. Housing is the favourite 
investment of the middle-class and the well-to-do, but in the very top financial and 
business assets dominate. In the top 9 % for capital income, real estate accounts for 
nearly 50 % of total capital income, but in the top 1 % real estate has been nearly totally 
replaced by financial and business assets. Shares of stocks and partnerships make up 
almost of all the very largest fortunes. (Piketty 2014 p. 260) 
 
Total income shares added up to are thus 25 %, 35 % and 50 % for the highest 10 % and 
30 %, 25 % and 20 % for the lower 50 %. (Piketty 2014 p. 249) Thus in the comparison 
only in the Scandinavian countries the higher 10 % earned less than the lower 50 % in 
total, and even this number represents the Scandinavian countries in 1970-1980's. Since 
then inequality has increased. 
 
Let's change perspective and examine the issue from a purely wealth inequality perspec-
tive. The Credit Suisse has released their Global Wealth Report of 2014 in October, 
which focused on wealth inequality in its special topic. Their researched covered the 
development of wealth inequality from 2000 to 2014. This time period is interesting as 
it allows for an insight on the effect that the Financial Crisis had. (Davies et al 2014 p. 
28) 
3.2 Wealth inequality 
The Credit Suisse report notes that through much of the 20th century the wealth inequal-
ity had been decreasing in high income countries, but that recently the decreasing trend 
has stalled and possibly reversed itself. (Davies et al 2014 p. 28) 
 
To find the cause, let's examine its development in the nations covered by the report. 
Data for the financial records is often lacking and long-term trend following thus im-
possible, but the Credit Suisse managed to gather sufficient data for ten countries: Aus-
tralia, the United Kingdom, the United States, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden 
France, the Netherlands and Switzerland. For these countries the trend showed decreas-
ing in the share of the top 1 % from 1920's to 1970's, followed by an evening out and 
then slow increase to 2014. The total effect for the whole period 1914-2010 showed de-
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creasing for all the countries expect Switzerland, which showed no particular trend. The 
wealth share of the next 4 % had remained the same in 2010 as it had been in 1914. 
(Davies et al 2014 p. 30) 
 
For the developments in the 21st century there is more data available, allowing for a 
global comparison. The short-term development for the whole world, except China and 
India, was much the same as it had been for the ten long-term countries, slow decreas-
ing of wealth inequality. This trend was however changed by the breaking of the Finan-
cial Crisis. Following 2007, wealth inequality first dropped sharply, but has since then 
been steadily increasing in every region, expect the US. In most countries the decrease 
in wealth inequality has already been surpassed by 2014. (Davies et al 2014 p. 33) 
 
For an actual figure reference, the share of wealth for the top 10 % in the US was 
74,6 % in 2000, increased slightly to 74,8 % in 2007 and finally dropped back to 74,6 % 
in 2014. France had much bigger changes from 56,4 % to 51,1 % and finally to 53,1 %. 
Germany went from 63,9 % to 61,7 % and stayed the same in 2014. Italy had 52,6 % 
and changed to 47,9 % and finally 51,5 %. For the Nordic countries, Sweden had 
69,7 %, dropped to 68,6 and stayed there all the way to 2014. Finland had 55,0 %, and 
dropped to 54,5 % and stayed there in 2014. For Asian countries, China had 48,6, in-
creased to 56,1 % and further increased to 64,0 %, a very rapid increasing trend and also 
very different from the US and the European countries. Japan had 51,0 %, dropped to 
49,4 % and further dropped to 48,5 %, a slower reversal of the China's trend. Russia 
started in 77,1 %,. dropped to 75,4 % and then shot to 84,8, a very quick reversal of the 
plummet in 2007. (Davies et al 2014 p. 33) 
 
So what do these figures actually tell us? We know that there are bound to be differ-
ences in emerging countries, such as Russia and China, in comparison to more devel-
oped countries, such as the US and the UK. However since the emerging and developed 
countries have experienced different types of trends within their own group, it cannot be 
the only factor affecting the trend. Notably many major countries closer to the heart of 
the Financial Crisis have not experienced an increase in the wealth inequality in the 
years following the crisis, with the exception of the UK. This can be explained, in part 
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at least, by the fact that the wealthy in those countries lost proportionally more and have 
not yet recovered from their losses. (Davies et al 2014 p. 33) 
3.2.1 Causes for wealth inequality 
Credit Suisse in its report divides the factors affecting wealth inequality by time period 
into long-term and short-term. 
 
Long-terms factors, as listed by Credit Suisse, include the growth of the economy, 
demographic trends, savings rate, inheritance arrangements, general macroeconomic 
trends (such as globalization) and government policies, such as taxation and pension 
provision.  
 
Short-term factors include changes in asset prices, because the wealth portfolio of 
households vary by income this affects income levels differently, and the exchange rates 
of currencies. (Davies et al 2014 p. 33-34) 
 
The Financial Crisis of 2007 was heavily affected by the sudden drop of asset prices. 
However it is not only the fall of asset prices that affects wealth inequality, but also the 
rising of them. The Credit Suisse report lists a theory that suggested rising asset prices 
are not only a consequence of the wealth inequality but also a cause of it. 
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 Figure 8: Feedback between inequality and asset prices 
Higher wealth inequality would allow for a greater disposable income for high income 
households, that typically save a larger portion of their income than lower income 
groups. Increased savings would create demand for more investment funds, as shown in 
figure 8. The increased number of funds would drive down interest rates and raise stock 
prices, thus further increasing profit for high income group in the form of capital gains. 
Increased capital gains further widen wealth inequality and the circle repeats itself. The 
low interest rate partly caused by this cycle also fuelled the development of the Finan-
cial Crisis of 2007. (Davies et al 2014 p. 34) 
 
Fast growth of economy, typically associated with successful entrepreneurs and new 
companies, is a cause of wealth inequality for emerging economies. As the new compa-
nies get listed they create wealth that is concentrated in the hands of the few, thus in-
creasing wealth inequality. Broader shareholdings and change of generations can dissi-
pate the effect, but it can still last for years. Part of the fast growth in wealth inequality 
in China and other emerging countries can be explained by this. 
 
Demographic trends, such as increased longevity and aging populace, will increase the 
effect of savings on wealth. With a population that lives longer than before, pensions 
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will need to be larger and the importance of the capability to save increases. This means 
that those who can save more of their income while working are relatively wealthier in 
the future. The effect is that high income groups who do not need to spend much of their 
income to cover basic needs will benefit more. This will mainly affect developed 
economies with advanced healthcare and aging populace, but also China because of the 
effect its one-child policy has had on the populace. Other notable demographic trends 
are increased gender-equality and smaller households. It is hard to see what effect 
smaller households will have on wealth inequality, but at least higher gender-equality 
could possible decrease wealth inequality in the current non-gender-equalitarian coun-
tries, as women would get a larger income due to better education, jobs and generally 
better opportunities to advance. (Davies et al 2014 p. 34-35) 
 
Inheritance is a primary effect in wealth inequality, as wealth created by the first gen-
eration can be accumulated more easily due to existing capital. Poor and middle-income 
households obviously cannot leave similar inheritances to their children as the high in-
come households can, and as the generations continue to accumulate wealth this effect 
will only increase. In countries where education and opportunity to advance are hard to 
come by, inheritance can dictate opportunity and mean everything. (Davies et al 2014 p. 
35-36) Inheritance is especially important in countries with low economic growth, as in 
low growth economies capital income will be relatively more profitable compared to 
labour income. (Piketty 2014 p.571-572) 
 
The last long-term factor affecting wealth inequality is government policy. Loose mone-
tary policy and strong economic growth both cause inflation. While not perhaps the in-
tended consequence by policymakers, inflation can have a large negative effect on sav-
ings, and since savings are a large part of the poor income household wealth portfolio it 
widens wealth inequality. (Davies et al 2014 p. 34) Credit Suisse also ironically list 
strong social welfare policies as source of wealth inequality. The logic is this, with 
many basic needs covered, such as education, good public pensions, unemployment and 
health insurances, there is no incentive to save for the low and middle income groups 
and spend all their earnings on consumption. The rich who have reached a saturation 
point with consumption and thus will not consume more, will save the larger share of 
their income for investments and thus accumulate even larger capital gains. This accord-
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ing to the report is the reason for the large wealth inequalities in Sweden, Norway and 
Denmark, although they generally are more equalitarian than many other countries. 
Government actions can also decrease wealth inequality. A large public sector decreases 
opportunities for the private sector and thus affects capital income and decreases high 
income. A more intentional way is through taxation: progressive income or estate taxes, 
wealth or capital income taxes, can all reduce wealth inequality. The primary reason for 
the decreasing wealth inequality levels through the 20th century is high levels of taxa-
tion. Of course taxes can also increase wealth inequality, if progressive taxes are re-
placed by flatter rates. Taxation has an important role in the economy and too heavy 
taxation can stifle the economic growth, but too loose or too flat taxation can cause 
massive wealth inequality. (Davies et al 2014 p. 36) 
3.3 Measures of economic inequality 
Now that we understand the structure of the economic inequality and the causes of it, 
we can focus on the measures used to evaluate it. To effectively study economic ine-
quality we will need ways to measure it between countries. 
3.3.1 The Lorenz Curve and the Gini Index 
One of the measures created for this purpose in 1905 by Max O. Lorenz is the Lorenz 
Curve. It depicts the share of total income by the share of population. In true economic 
equality the line would be linear and the further the depicted line of a country gets from 
it the more unequal it is. It also allows to graphically measure how much of the income 
goes to which income level. (G. Clarke 1992) 
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Figure 9: Lorenz Curve for the Nordic countries 
It's weakness, as highlighted by the comparison of Nordic countries, is that the differ-
ences are not readily visible if the countries are not very different from each other. This 
Lorenz curve is based on World Bank income share data. 
 
So in the Nordic countries, the lower 20 % of population hold 10 % of total income, the 
lower 40 % hold little more than 20 % of income, 60 % of the population hold 40 % of 
income, and finally 80 % hold 60 %. This would lead to the conclusion that the top 
20 % would hold close to 40 % total income. This result is in line with Piketty's findings. 
 
Due to the weaknesses of the Lorenz curve most researchers use the Gini coefficient 
instead. The Gini coefficient quantifies economic inequality into one figure between 0 
and 1. The closer to 0 the country's Gini coefficient is the more economically equal the 
society is.  
 
However this tool either is not without its faults, but like with the GDP we use it be-
cause it is simple. The compression of the data into just one number means that we lose 
the ability to analyze the effect of various income levels on the total inequality. Another 
problem with it, as Piketty outlines, is that we lose the ability to differentiate between 
labour and capital income and thus cannot see the exact causes of the inequality (Piketty 
2014 p. 266-267). The structure of inequality between two countries with the same Gini 
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coefficient could be widely different. Additionally long-term studying of the Gini Index 
is difficult because of lacking data for many countries and years. 
 
This lack of data is shown in the observed linear development for Norway and Sweden 
in figure 10. In order to see the trend graphically the missing years were filled with av-
erage values between the two years with existing data. The movements of the Gini coef-
ficients tend to be small so missing data from a few years does not dispute the validity 
of the trend observed. 
 
 
Figure 10: Gini index for the Nordic countries  
 
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden 
1995 0.21  0.22  0.24  0.21  
1996 0.22  0.23  0.25  0.22  
1997 0.22  0.24  0.25  0.22  
1998 0.22  0.24  0.25  0.23  
1999 0.23  0.25  0.26  0.24  
2000 0.23  0.26  0.26  0.24  
2001 0.23  0.26  0.26  0.24  
2002 0.23  0.26  0.27  0.24  
2003 0.23  0.26  0.27  0.24  
2004 0.23  0.27  0.28  0.23  
2005 0.23  0.27  0.27  0.24  
2006 0.24  0.27  0.26  0.25  
2007 0.25  0.27  0.26  0.25  
2008 0.24  0.27  0.25  0.26  
2009 0.24  0.26  0.24  0.27  
2010 0.25  0.26  0.25  0.27  
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2011 0.25  0.27  0.25  0.27  
Table 8: Gini index for the Nordic countries 
 
The Gini Index, with data from the OECD, clearly confirms the Credit Suisse findings 
on rising economic inequality as all depicted countries show a overall increasing trend 
(OECD). Norway shows an interesting drop from 2003 to 2009, but it too shows signs 
of increasing inequality. Sweden's development is especially alarming since in 1995 it 
started at a level lower than any of the others and is now leading with a seemingly still 
widening gap. 
4 THE EFFECT OF ECONOMIC INEQUALITY ON GROWTH 
In order to fully examine the effects of economic inequality on growth we will need to 
first validate the link between them. The first option to do this is to perform a simple 
scatter analysis with data based on economic growth and inequality. The OECD has 
analyzed all the OECD countries on based on these factors.  Their scatter chart variables 
for economic growth is based on real GDP per capita and the inequality variable on the 
Gini coefficient. 
 
 
Figure 11: OECD Scatter chart on inequality in OECD countries 
No obvious trend is apparent from the scatter chart, which shows we need more vari-
ables and use regression analysis to prove the connection. The OECD report by Federi-
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co Cingano published on December 2014 has an interesting model with a theory prov-
ing the connection. 
 
Variable Measure 
Economic growth Real GDP per capita 
Inequality Gini Index 
Physical capital (investments) Fixed capital formation to real GDP 
Human capital Average years of schooling of the working 
age (15 - 64) population 
 
The empirical model estimates growth as a linear function of initial inequality, income, 
human and physical capital; the model is similar to that used in most empirical analyses 
of growth determinants and can be derived from an augmented Solow growth model. 
(Cingano 2014 p. 14)  
 
Written out the model takes the form:  
 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1𝛽 + 𝛾𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
 
Countries are indicated by a  𝑖 and (𝑡, 𝑡−1) is a time interval of 5 years. The output vari-
able on the left hand side 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 measures the 5-year growth of per capita 
GDP.  𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞 is a measure of inequality, in this case the Gini index, per capita GDP (yt- 
1) is used as the standard control for convergence, and the vector X contains a minimum 
set of controls for human and physical capital. This means that the baseline model does 
not account for cumulating population growth, capital depreciation and technological 
progress. The reason for these controls is to prevent sample size from decreasing further 
from already small sizes due to the limited availability of inequality data. Additionally 
within country variation of population growth is assumed to change very little.  Cingano 
also uses panel data to allow accounting for country fixed effects (𝜇𝑖 and 𝜇𝑡). The coun-
try dummies are included to control for time-invariant omitted-variable bias, and the 
period dummies are included to control for global shocks, which might affect aggregate 
growth in any period but are not otherwise captured by the explanatory variables. 
(Cingano 2014 p. 45-46) 
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Cingano uses panel data to add more variables to the equation, but for our purpose of 
linking economic inequality to growth the first two columns are sufficient.  The empiric 
results show that inequality has a negative effect on growth. In the first column the 
model shows growth as a dependent of initial income and inequality (Gini coefficient), 
but the second column adds the variants human and physical capital without affecting 
the effect of inequality on growth significantly. However the estimated coefficients on 
human capital and investment are not statistically significant. Additionally the p-values 
show that we are unable to dismiss the null hypothesis. This may be linked to the inade-
quacy of the measure for inequality, as show in the later regression model by 
Voitchovsky. This is examined in more detail later. Cingano's model would suggest that 
lowering Gini coefficient by one point would cause growth of 8 % in five years. (Cin-
gano 2014 p. 17) 
 
Cingano's model shows a link to economic growth, but the p-values show that this 
model is not sufficient to fully explain the connection. We can therefore compare it to 
other models. Sarah Voitchovsky uses a fairly similar panel data growth model. Her 
variables include several of the same variables used by Cingano. 
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Variable Measure 
Economic growth Real GDP per capita 
Inequality Gini coefficient, Luxembourg Income 
Study and also several ratios of income 
percentiles 
Physical capital (investments) Average share of gross fixed capital for-
mation in GDP over the five years 
Human capital Average years of schooling in the popula-
tion aged 25 and over 
 
The difference lies with the used inequality measure. However as both models put 
growth as the dependent variable this difference does not reduce comparability, but 
should instead highlight validation for the same matter from a slightly different perspec-
tive. 
 
Written out the model takes the form:  
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 = (𝛼 −1) 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝛽 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 
 
To keep the formula as close to the form Voitchovsky used, we will not write 𝑙𝑛 in the 
formula like Cingano did even though the growth measure 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 on the left hand 
side measures the same 5-year growth of per capita GDP like Cingano's model.  Also 
similarly 𝑖 denotes a country, 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 includes unobserved country specific effect and the 
vector 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 contains current or lagged values of several explanatory variables. These 
include the inequality measures, and the physical and human capital measures. 
(Voitchovsky 2005 p. 281-282) 
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The results from the inequality measures do not appear significantly related to economic 
growth when used separately, but a joint measure in column 7 and the Gini and top 
measure used in column 4 are indicated as highly significant with p-values of 0,029 and 
0,018 respectively. (Voitchovsky 2005 p. 287) This is a interesting difference in com-
parison to Cingano's model. The major difference between this model and Cingano's lies 
in the used inequality measure, so clearly the Gini index is inadequate to explain the 
connection between inequality and growth by itself. Additionally Voitchovsky notes a 
interesting detail in columns 2 and 3. In column 2 with the top only inequality measure 
of 90/75 the correlation is positive, so increased inequality will positively affect growth. 
While in column 3 for the bottom only inequality measure of 50/10 the correlation is 
negative, decreased growth for increased inequality. (Voitchovsky 2005 p. 288) This 
highlights an interesting perspective into the different roles of income levels in inequal-
ity and the inadequacy of one inequality measure in fully explaining the correlation.  
 
Nevertheless Voitchovsky's findings confirm Cingano's by linking inequality to growth. 
By putting the findings of both together the ideal approach to inequality regarding 
growth would be to discourage it on the lower income levels and encourage it on higher 
income levels. 
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 To consider the effects of economic inequality on economy, it is important to under-
stand the wealth portfolios and consumption of each income level, since higher eco-
nomic inequality will lower consumption and investments of poor and possibly middle 
income households, and increase the consumption and investments of high income 
households. 
 
At lower income wealth is mostly compromised of savings and thus vulnerable to infla-
tion, since interest on savings is rarely high enough to cover it. Debts are also more 
prominent, because of the often typically longer payback periods and higher interest 
demanded by banks for loans. Capital income is nearly non-existent for most poor in-
come households. Thus their the primary contribution to economic growth is through 
consumption, most of what they earn through wages will go directly to consumption 
and very little is saved. (Davies et al 2014 p. 34) 
 
Middle income households are more varied. Their primary form of wealth is often their 
family home, but the more affluent can also hold stocks and other financial assets. A 
higher percentage of their income is saved rather than consumed compared to the lower 
income households, but consumption is still larger than savings. (Davies et al 2014 p. 
34) 
 
For high income households, the wealth portfolio consists of financial and business as-
sets, but also significant real estate assets. The higher we climb the income levels the 
more prominently financial and business assets replace housing assets (Piketty 2014 p. 
260).  This is why rising financial and business asset prices tend to increase economic 
inequality. Rising housing prices, as noted by the report by Credit Suisse, tend to de-
crease the share of wealth by the top percentile (Davies et al 2014 p. 34).  This confirms 
Piketty's findings. So high income households either save or invest large parts of their 
income, and this naturally decreases the portion going to consumption. 
 
The logic for decreasing consumption by income level is this. The higher the income for 
a household rises the easier it is to meet the needs for products and services. After a 
while all the needs will become saturated and there is no need to purchase more. The 
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left over income will then be saved or invested. Of course there are luxury product spe-
cifically meant for high income households, but there is a definite limit to demand for 
even those. This saturation process is clearly depicted by Engel's coefficient. Engel's 
law states that the percentage of income spent on food decreases as income rises and 
while food cannot represent all products and definitely not services, the principle re-
mains the same. (Investopedia 2010b) 
 
Thus higher economic inequality means lower consumption from poor and middle in-
come households, and more investments and savings from the high income households. 
The additional investments will then create more capital, but since lower income con-
sumption has decreased and cannot be permanently financed by loans, the economy will 
face a crisis. The very situation depicted in the Marxist theory of overproduc-
tion/underconsumption. However couldn't the high income households cover the de-
creased consumption of lower income households with their own? In the short run it is 
certainly feasible, after all luxury products cost much more and at least partly compen-
sate for the higher number of poorer households. In the long run it is hard to imagine a 
rich person consuming the same amount as 1000 poor people. The exact number would 
depend on the population of the country and the local economic inequality. 
 
In high economic inequality countries, growth would then have to come from increased 
investments, but since domestic consumption is simultaneously curbed these investment 
would most likely focus abroad. This would then generate capital income from these 
countries, but would not bolster domestic employment or generate as much tax revenue 
for the government. The effect of decreased consumption in favour of more investments, 
would thus unlikely be profitable for the country in question.  
 
The conclusion is then that extremely high forms of economic growth would at least 
slow economic growth. Not to mention the possibility to cause significant social unrest. 
We should then focus on decreasing inequality to more sustainable levels. But who de-
termines the right level of inequality? Especially since Voitchovsky's findings indicated 
inequality on the higher levels of income might be useful for economic growth. This is a 
matter of discussion for the population of each country in question. Piketty sought to put 
the matter in perspective by quoting the US Declaration of Independence, which states 
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that "men are born free and remain free and equal in rights." Further clarified by "social 
distinctions can be based only on common utility." But what is common utility? 
Piketty's interpretation is that "social inequalities are acceptable only if they are in the 
interest of all and in particular of the most disadvantaged social groups." (cp. Piketty 
2014 p. 479-480) Achieving equality on the level dictated by the Declaration sounds 
fairly utopian, but at least we can strive for it. 
4.1 Measures to decrease economic inequality 
One of the measures that decreases economic inequality is strong demographic growth, 
this is because it decreases the significance of inherited wealth. Inherited wealth, as 
mentioned earlier makes it much easier to accumulate further wealth due to capital in-
come. It might also dictate opportunity in countries with lower education and social ine-
quality.(Piketty 2014 p. 83) 
 
Which takes us to an another measure for decreased inequality, the diffusion of knowl-
edge and investments in training and skills. This force operates not only within a coun-
try, but also between them. This is evident with countries like China, that adopt produc-
tion modes and skills of the rich countries and gain a huge jump in productivity, boost-
ing their growth. (Piketty 2014 p. 22) 
 
Demographic growth and the diffusion of knowledge may occur more or less naturally 
as the economy matures, but since economic inequality is not just an emerging market 
country problems it is evident that the forces of divergence can be stronger than conver-
gence in even mature economies. Piketty's suggested solution to this is a progressive 
global annual tax on capital. He himself admits that it is an utopian idea, and actually 
implementing would require unrealistic levels of international cooperation (Piketty 2014 
p. 515). The difference between his idea and existing forms of capital taxation is that 
this tax would be progressive and would be applied to all forms of assets: real estate, 
financial assets and business assets (Piketty 2014 p. 517). The point he underlines is that 
the purpose of this tax would not be to replace other forms of taxation as a source of 
revenue, but to stop the divergent effect of capital income on economic inequality. The 
tax would also serve to regulate the financial and banking system in order to protect 
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against financial crises. Additionally significant gain of this would be increased trans-
parency for the financial system, by requiring everyone to report their ownership of 
capital assets. This in turn would require increased sharing of international banking data 
between authorities, with the effect of eliminating tax evasion through tax havens. 
(Piketty 2014 p. 519-521).  Instant global introduction of the progressive annual capital 
tax is hardly realistic, so Piketty outlined a theoretical case of Europe adopting the tax. 
The rate would be 0 % for fortunes below 1 million Euros, 1 % between 1 and 5 million 
Euros, and 2 % for above. This he estimates, if applied to the European Union countries, 
would generate revenues equivalent to 2 % of Europe's GDP (Piketty 2014 p. 528). Not 
an insignificant number. 
 
Now that we considered measures to decrease economic inequality, let's focus on the 
second research question of this thesis and consider them in conjunction with economic 
growth. 
4.2 Measures to stimulate growth 
The source of economic growth is aggregate demand and supply. The economy can also 
be boosted by an increase in productivity, but since this is mainly done through improv-
ing training, equipment and technology it can be said to be a component of supply. As 
mentioned earlier, consumption cannot be decreased too far without also hurting in-
vestments, but the same is also true in reverse. Too much consumption, will lower funds 
available for invest. Investments, as mentioned, play a crucial role in maintaining com-
petitivity. This in turn affects the employment rate and wages, which feed consumption.  
 
The issue is thus to pursue measures that don't unduly burden consumption or invest-
ments. Let's us examine each of the measures used in decreasing economic inequality. 
 
Strong demographic growth can be achieved through either a natural increase of popula-
tion, more births, or immigration. High immigration can cause social unrest, but if the 
social policies succeed in easing assimilation to local population it can be a great source 
of economic growth as outlined in the chapter about economic growth. So as a measure 
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to decrease economic inequality, not only does this measure not harm consumption or 
investment, it actually increases them. 
 
Diffusion of knowledge too is highly beneficial to economic activity. However this 
measure is of less use in already developed economies as education already plays a sig-
nificant role and efficient production is widespread. It however outlines the importance 
of maintaining high quality education available to all. If higher education becomes too 
expensive for the lower income households it will lower social mobility and increase 
inequality. Inheritance would play a larger role in determining opportunity. 
 
The last measure, the proposed progressive global annual tax on capital, is less clear on 
its effect on economic activity. A very high rate would obviously kill of investments 
altogether and constitute an economic suicide. However in many developed economies, 
the combined effect of the previously mentioned measures is not enough to combat the 
widening economic inequality. One of the only remaining tools left is taxation, and 
Piketty's suggestion contains many interesting ideas, such as the decreased effect of tax 
havens, more transparent financial and banking system and finally a regulative effect 
against reckless speculation by the investors. The concern is of course that the tax 
would lower investment, but to this Piketty suggests that the tax would act as an incen-
tive to invest more efficiently. The logic goes like this, in order to cover the tax rate of 1 
or 2 %, the investor would have to seek out investments with higher yields. Those inca-
pable of this would lose their assets and the assets would pass to more dynamic inves-
tors. (Piketty 2014 p. 526). According to Piketty, the average real rate of return on capi-
tal is 4-5 %, so it should not be impossible to manage finding higher yield investments 
than 1 or 2 % (Piketty 2014 p. 572). The real problem with this suggestion is not effect 
on investment, but rather that it requires unforeseen levels of international cooperation 
to implement globally. The solution would be strive for it incrementally, as suggested 
by Piketty, first on a regional level such as Europe (Piketty 2014 p. 515). 
5 CONCLUSION 
To start our discussion on the effect of economic inequality on economic growth, we 
first needed to examined the various reasons for which a country can experience eco-
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nomic growth. Growth we will take as an increase in the real GDP per capita, that is 
GDP adjusted for the affects of population and inflation. The effects that affect GDP 
can be divided into demand and supply side effects. This is because of the theory that 
economy is based on aggregate demand and supply. Keynesians will place more impor-
tance on aggregate demand. This is because they believe demand will create supply, a 
preference to focus on consumption over investment. The classical economists on the 
other hand have faith in Say's law which is a reverse of what the Keynesians believe. 
Regardless of which to focus on, both can be said to be important for economic growth. 
 
After growth we focused on economic inequality and its causes. We found the causes of 
economic inequality to be divided into short and long run effects. The short run effects 
are the changes in asset prices and exchange rates. The long run effects are the rapid 
growth of the economy, demographic trends, savings rate, inheritance arrangements, 
general macroeconomic trends and possibly government policies. We then examined 
two measures for economic inequality, the Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient, their 
merits and faults. After covering both growth and economic inequality we needed to 
find significant evidence of a link between them. The regression analyses and models by 
Cingano and Voitchovsky showed a correlation between inequality and growth, with 
growth as the dependent variable. Cingano's regression model did not fully explain the 
connection, as indicated by the p-values, but as Voitchovsky's model shows this can at 
least partly be explained by the inadequacy of the Gini index as a inequality variable. 
 
With both growth and economic inequality covered we could finally focus on the re-
search questions. Economic inequality was found to cause imbalances between con-
sumption and investments, the two primary causes of economic growth. These imbal-
ances could then potentially lead to recession, or even a financial crisis. The resulting 
crisis, would then have a disastrous effect on accumulated capital. The loss in capital 
would affect capital income, and thus lower economic inequality. With the first research 
question covered we focused on the measures to reduce economic inequality without 
unduly hampering economic growth. The findings indicated that many of the possible 
measures were tied to the maturation of the economy, but were insufficient to stop the 
increase of inequality in developed economies. This is particularly the case for econo-
mies with a high level of financialization, like the US (Investopedia 2004). No naturally 
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existing balancing mechanisms were thus proven to exist, leaving government policies 
as the only option of decreasing economic inequality. Thomas Piketty suggested the 
creation of a progressive global annual tax on capital. The benefits of that tax would in-
clude the decreased effect of tax havens, more transparent financial and banking system 
and finally a regulative effect against reckless speculation by the investors. The problem 
is that it requires currently unreasonable levels of international cooperation. The first 
step could be a banking union in the EU. 
 
Further research on this topic could therefore focus on the potential advantages and dis-
advantages of this banking union and how it would affect the taxation needed to tackle 
the economic inequality. 
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